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REDEFINING COASTAL WETLAND POLICY IN 
SEARCH OF ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
HARMONY 
Paul J. Morrow, Esq.* 
LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY, AND 
POLITICS. By Royal C. Gardner. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 2011. 
Pp. 1, 199. $35.00 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, environmental awareness has come to the forefront 
as society continues to realize the negative environmental impacts that 
arise from the uninhibited growth of modern economies.  Terms such as 
“green electricity,” “hybrid,” “Energy-Star,” and “organic” have come 
into common use.  Likewise, concerns about global warming, ocean 
pollution, and Arctic melting have resulted in political activism across 
the world.   At the same time, the benefits derived from modern 
economic development create an implicit need to balance the costs of 
such development with environmental sustainability.  Like it or not, 
mankind’s impact on the environment will never be eliminated.  Instead, 
creative solutions must be found to enable society to better harmonize 
economic development with environmental protection.  To date, the 
development of environmental enforcement standards has been 
inconsistent, and the complexity of economic and environmental 
coexistence has created difficulties for regulators and politicians alike.  
This review focuses on the legal, economic, and social implications of 
the use of wetlands, as analyzed by Professor Royal C. Gardner in his 
book, Lawyers, Swamps, and Money: U.S. Wetland Law, Policy, and 
Politics.1  As Professor Gardner states:  
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[W]etlands pay society’s bills. Wetlands provide a host of 
ecosystem services, functions that benefit people. Long viewed 
as the mosquito-breeding nuisances that must be drained, 
wetlands have recently had their reputations rehabilitated. We 
now recognize that wetlands provide important habitat for 
animals and plants, support the seafood industry, protect homes 
and businesses from floods, and help improve water quality. 
Sadly, we often appreciate the value of wetlands and their 
ecosystem services only after they are gone (or degraded).2 
Professor Gardner’s book takes on the laudable goal of providing its 
reader with a fundamental understanding of the inner-workings of 
wetland policy.  It accomplishes this task in the short span of 200 pages, 
bringing the reader through the regulatory framework of wetland law and 
into the world of definitions and mitigation techniques.  Along the way, 
Gardner entertains us with various cases and political stories that have 
helped to define the field.  The result is that Professor Gardner’s unique 
perspective makes this book a must-read for any individual interested in 
wetland law.  
II.  HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF WETLANDS 
Gardner’s analysis begins with a well rounded historical examination 
of the public perception of wetlands.3  Early perceptions of wetlands 
were bleak, and perhaps no case better displays this than the 1900 case of 
Leovy v. United States, in which the Supreme Court stated “that swamps 
and stagnant waters are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and 
that the police power is never more legitimately exercised than in 
removing such nuisances.”4  The Court further noted that conversion of 
the swamp land in question to agricultural land would increase its value 
from $5,000 to $300,000.5 
Such a negative view of wetlands was not atypical of the times.  In 
fact, some scholars posit that we have lost more than half of the wetlands 
in the United States since the 1780s.6  For at least ten states, this number 
                                                                                                  
 1. ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, 
POLICY, AND POLITICS (2011).  
 2. Id. at 1-2. 
 3. Id. at 5. 
 4. 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900). 
 5. Id. at 628. 
 6. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 95. 
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rises to as high as seventy percent.7  Much of the reason for this loss can 
be traced to farmers, who sought out wetlands as nutrient-rich soils.8  
Gardner states:  
With government subsidies and price supports, farmers 
continued to drain and convert wetlands well into the twentieth 
century. Between 1950 and 1970, annual wetland losses 
attributable to agricultural activities were about 250,000 acres. 
By the 1970s and the 1980s, the rate of loss was still 290,000 
acres per year. Only recently . . . has farming ceased to be the 
primary cause of wetland losses.9 
Wetlands were also extensively developed to accommodate commercial 
and residential development as developers sought out wetlands as a 
cheaper alternative to dry land.10  Today, rural and urban development 
has taken the lead in the destruction of wetlands.11  Additionally, the 
introduction of invasive species,12 oil exploration,13 coal removal,14 and 
road construction projects15 have also contributed to the loss of wetland 
habitat. 
In recent years, however, wetlands have enjoyed a more positive 
public image.  Not only have scientific advances brought to light the 
importance of wetlands as animal habitats, and thus piqued the interest of 
environmentalists the world over,16 they have also revealed the 
importance of wetlands to the sustainability of commercial fisheries.17  
As Gardner points out, “75 percent of commercial fish and shellfish in 
the United States rely on estuaries and coastal wetland systems.”18  This 
fact was heavily highlighted by the national media19 and academics 
                                            
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 97. 
 13. Id. at 96. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 8. 
 17. Id. at 11. 
 18. Id. 
 19. John M. Broder, House Panel Faults Administration Spill Response, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 2, 2011, 2:22 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/house-panel-faults-
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during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.20  Likewise, wetland bird-
related activity accounts for nearly $32 billion in annual economic 
spending.21  Wetlands have also been found to improve water quality, 
mitigate flood damages by absorbing water, and provide recreational 
value to millions each year.22 
These factors have combined to foster a government policy of 
achieving “no net loss” of wetland acreage.23  To realize this goal, 
Congress implemented the “Swampbuster” program in 1985, whereby 
farmers were penalized in the form of cuts to their subsidies if they 
“drained or altered a wetland.”24  Similarly, the Wetlands Reserve 
Program protected wetlands by paying farmers who “restor[ed] and 
protect[ed] wetlands.”25  This program allowed the government to pay for 
up to a hundred percent of the restoration costs, depending on the level of 
wetland protection provided by a farmer.26  Since 1992, the Wetlands 
Reserve Program has resulted in the protection of “almost 2 million acres 
at a cost of approximately $2.1 billion,” and both programs have 
generally been regarded as successes.27 
Non-farming projects have proven a more difficult challenge.  One 
method of offsetting wetland losses from rural and urban construction 
has been through “compensatory mitigation.”28  When issuing a section 
404 permit, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) will require a 
developer to offset any wetland damage it causes by “restor[ing], 
enhanc[ing], creat[ing], and/or preserv[ing] other wetlands.”29  In this 
way, the Corps hopes to grant permits while still realizing “no net loss.”30  
However, several studies suggest that the section 404 mitigation program 
has not worked.31  Enforcement of mitigation commitments has been 
“almost nonexistent,”32 and even when permitees have restored wetlands, 
the long-term effects of that restoration remain questionable.33 
                                            
 20. Edward B. Barbier, Coastal Wetland Restoration and the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1821, 1832 (2011).  
 21. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 56.  
 22. Id. at 11-12.  
 23. Id. at 93. 
 24. Id. at 100. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 100-01. 
 27. Id. at 101 (internal citations omitted). 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 102. 
 31. Id. at 106. 
 32. Id. at 109. 
 33. Id. at 108. 
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Gardner highlights two creative solutions that have arisen to resolve 
the problems associated with compensatory mitigation.34  One is the idea 
of mitigation banking, which enables developers to offset the impact of 
wetland development by purchasing environmental credits from other 
developers who have restored wetlands.35  Under this theory, 
performance mitigation credits are granted to a developer once they 
satisfactorily restore a wetland.36  These credits can be banked for future 
use, allowing the developer to offset damages from wetland projects in 
advance.37  Beginning in 1993, this concept was taken a step further 
when the first entrepreneurial mitigation bank began to sell mitigation 
credits to developers from restoration projects it had completed.38  
Congress demonstrated its support of this process in 1998 when it passed 
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,39 which expressly 
created a market for mitigation banks.40 
The other creative solution currently competing with mitigation 
banking is in-lieu fee mitigation.41  Here, a third party takes on the 
obligations to restore wetlands that the developer incurs in exchange for 
a fee.42  The third party is typically a nonprofit organization or 
government agency, and the funds received from the developer are 
deposited into an account for use on a later project.43  Thus, unlike in 
mitigation banking, the restoration is not completed at the front.  While 
this is one downside of in-lieu fee mitigation, the program does provide 
better protection than the compensatory mitigation program because 
payment from the developer is still received before the development 
project begins.44  However, Gardner points out that the success of the in-
lieu fee program has not been on par with that of mitigation banking.45 
In attempting to provide coherence among these three programs, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Corps issued a final rule in 
2008 governing compensatory mitigation and expressly providing for 
                                            
 34. For an extensive discussion of the merits of all three mitigation options, see 
generally, Travis E. Booth, Compensatory Mitigation: What is the Best Approach?, 11 U. 
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 205 (2004).  
 35. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 13.  
 36. Id. at 112-13.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 115. 
 39. 23 U.S.C. § 108 (2006). 
 40. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 119. 
 41. Id. at 129. 
 42. Id. at 130. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 131. 
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mitigation banking and in-lieu fee mitigation.46  Mitigation banking was 
given primacy in the regulation (meaning a mitigation banking credit was 
given more value than other mitigation credits) over in-lieu fee 
mitigation, with more traditional compensatory mitigation coming in as 
the least favorable option.47  Thus, at present, developers have three 
options: buy a mitigation banking credit up front, pay for in-lieu fee 
credits, or conduct compensatory mitigation actions on their own.  
III.  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Professor Gardner’s book dedicates itself largely to the task of 
describing the regulatory framework governing wetland policy.  This 
comprehensive coverage includes a detailed exploration into the realm of 
administrative law, which largely governs wetland law.48  Agencies 
make, apply, regulate, and enforce the rules, and while courts may 
review final agency decisions, they are often reluctant to overturn them.49  
This canon of review gives the EPA and Corps enormous power to 
regulate the spirit of economic development.  Accordingly, Professor 
Gardner emphasizes the importance of “understanding administrative 
law [as] a prerequisite for understanding wetland law and policy.”50 
Providing a short course in administrative law, Gardner cuts through 
the complexities of the process to highlight the importance that it plays in 
wetland law.51  He quickly focuses the reader on political realities by 
pointing out that Congress provides the authority and funding, while the 
President provides the political appointments for administrative 
agencies.52  While agencies are partially insulated from political 
pressures by virtue of their corps of career specialists, Gardner points to 
examples of instances where even career employees were not immune 
from political backfire.53  That being said, Gardner accepts the presence 
of politics in the administrative process because of the legitimacy it 
brings to agency actions affecting private and public property rights.54 
                                            
 46. Id. at 151 (referencing 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b) (2012)).  
 47. Id. at 156. 
 48. Id. at 16. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. Id. at 18. 
 53. Id. at 20.  (pointing to Michael Davis, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Civil Works). 
 54. Id. at 22. 
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Next, Lawyers, Swamps, and Money turns to the origins of wetland 
law.  Here, a brief synopsis is appropriate.  In 1972, Congress passed the 
Clean Water Act over the veto of President Nixon in order to “restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”55  To accomplish this task, Congress established 
specialized permitting processes for various forms of pollutants.56  The 
EPA was given authority to grant permits for point sources of pollutants 
through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
under section 402.57  However, as it soon became apparent that “dredge 
and fill material” from construction projects harmed wetlands as 
extensively as more traditional sources of toxic pollutants, Congress 
enacted section 404 and placed authority to issue permits for such 
materials with the Corps.58  To forge a compromise between the House 
(which favored the Corps because of its experience with construction 
projects under the Rivers and Harbors Act) and Senate (which favored 
the EPA because of its focus on environmental issues), section 404 was 
drafted to provide the EPA with veto power over the Corps’ decisions.59 
Gardner’s characterization of the EPA and Corps as “strange 
bedfellows” governing the realm of wetland law strikes true because it 
recognizes the complexities of co-management that exist between an 
organization with construction as its lifeblood (the Corps) and one with 
environmental protection at its core (the EPA).60  For the government to 
have its act together, the system must be coherent in authority.  As a 
solution, “the Corps and the EPA signed an enforcement memorandum 
of agreement (MOA) in 1989 that delineated their roles and 
responsibilities.”61  Pursuant to this agreement,  
the Corps agreed to be the lead agency for actions involving 
section 404 permit violations terms and conditions, which made 
sense since the Corps is the permit-issuing agency. For 
unpermitted discharges (i.e. when someone filled a wetland and 
failed to apply for a permit), the MOA left open which agency 
would be lead. It stated that the Corps would serve as lead 
agency, unless the case involved a repeat violator or a flagrant 
violation, and then the EPA would step in. The EPA would also 
                                            
 55. Id. at 23. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 74-75.  
 60. Id. at 73-74. 
 61. Id. at 160. 
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be the lead agency, however, if it simply requested a particular 
case.62 
A. Waters of the United States 
Gardner turns next to the questions of definition that have plagued 
the field of wetland law.  Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps 
had long ago established that the definition of “navigable waters” would 
mean those waters that could be traversed “in the traditional sense: 
navigable in fact (used in commerce), navigable in the future with 
reasonable improvements, navigable in the past, and subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide.”63  Like the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Clean 
Water Act also included the language “navigable waters,” and the Corps 
quickly interpreted this to mean that its jurisdiction under that Act 
extended only to navigable waters falling within its Rivers and Harbors 
Act definition.64  This left wetlands that were adjacent to navigable 
waters, but un-navigable themselves, in a precarious situation.  
Opponents of the Corps’ interpretation quickly latched onto the fact that, 
unlike in the Rivers and Harbors Act, Congress defined “navigable 
waters” to mean “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act.65  
Thus, the Corps’ interpretation was challenged in Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Callaway, and the U.S. District Court ruled that the 
Corps’ definition was incorrect.66  Thereafter, Gardner states,  the Corps 
defined “waters of the United States” to include “wetlands adjacent to 
traditional navigable waters and their tributaries, as well as all other 
isolated wetlands (having no hydrological connection to other 
waterbodies) that had some nexus to interstate commerce.”67 
This newfound harmony, however, was short-lived as private 
property owners and developers soon challenged the reasonableness of 
the Corps’ interpretation.  In United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes,68 when a property owner challenged an injunction by the Corps 
from developing on marshland, the Supreme Court upheld the Corps’ 
decision to include “adjacent wetlands” in the definition of “waters of the 
                                            
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 38. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
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United States.”69  However, the Corps fared worse in the face of a 
challenge to its inclusion of “isolated waters” in the definition of its 
wetland jurisdiction on the basis of the Migratory Bird Rule.70  Here, a 
consortium of Chicago-area communities seeking to utilize the site of a 
blue heron rookery to deposit nonhazardous waste challenged the Corps’ 
Migratory Bird Rule, claiming that it was not a reasonable interpretation 
of the Clean Water Act.71  The Supreme Court agreed and struck down 
the Corps’ interpretation on the basis that isolated waters, as defined by 
the Migratory Bird Rule, lacked “a significant nexus” to the navigable 
waters of the United States.72  As a result, the Corps was forced to 
refocus its jurisdiction over isolated waters by basing it on the hydrologic 
connection of those waters to navigable waters.73 
The Supreme Court considered the Corps’ definition of “waters of 
the United States” again in Rapanos v. United States, when challenges 
were made to the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands located near man-
made drainage ditches that discharged in navigable waters.74  The Court 
was unable to come to a majority decision as to which waters fell within 
the jurisdiction of the Corps under the Clean Water Act.75  Four justices 
stated that a wetland must be “a relatively permanent body of water 
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters”76 and having “a 
continuous surface connection . . . making it difficult to determine where 
the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”77  Four other justices believed 
that the Corps’ interpretation was “a quintessential example of the 
Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.”78  Finally, 
Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, believed that a showing of 
a “significant nexus” must be made for jurisdiction to rest with the 
                                            
 69. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 43 (referencing Riverview Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 
135). 
 70. Id. at 44 (referencing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)). The Migratory Bird Rule stemmed from the 
announcement by the Corps that it would “regulate activities in isolated waters (including 
wetlands) that are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state 
lines.’”  Id.  The focus on “use” by migratory birds, rather than the nexus between the 
isolated water and navigable waters, would prove to be the Migratory Bird Rule’s 
downfall.  Id. at 45. 
 71. Id. at 45. 
 72. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 167. 
 73. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 46.  
 74. 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 732. 
 77. Id. at 742. 
 78. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Corps.79  As a result, the Corps was left in a precarious situation with no 
clear guidance as to its jurisdictional authority.  To cover all of the bases, 
the Corps announced that its “significant nexus analysis would focus on 
whether the waters in question ‘significantly affect the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable 
waters.’”80 
Of course, the root cause of much of the debate surrounding wetland 
definitions stems from the fact that what constitutes a wetland can vary 
greatly depending upon the methodology used to define it.81  For 
instance, Gardner points out that in 1987, for purposes of defining 
wetland boundaries, the Corps delineation manual focused its analysis on 
“hydrology, vegetation, and soils,” while the EPA placed a greater 
reliance on vegetation.82  Even when a joint agency manual was released 
in 1989, regulatory interpretation of that manual resulted in large-scale 
reclassification of wetland areas, which in turn resulted in the 
implementation of a public notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement 
by the Bush Administration.83  With so much debate even within the 
scientific community, it should come as little surprise that the Supreme 
Court has found this issue to be a difficult one as well. 
Gardner suggests that the solution to the definitional strife created by 
the Clean Water Act is for Congress to resolve the ambiguity itself.84  
Another solution, espoused by Chief Justice Roberts in his Rapanos 
concurrence, would be for the Corps to utilize its rulemaking authority to 
establish an outer boundary to the “reach of [its] authority. . . . [rather 
than] adher[ing] to its essentially boundless view of the scope of its 
power.”85  Both solutions, it seems, would resolve the problem. 
Gardner’s suggestion would be the purist’s solution.  But, the likelihood 
of such a clarification coming from Congress is minimal because the 
ambiguities that exist within the Clean Water Act are political 
kryptonite.86  As a result, the most timely solution may well be for the 
Corps and EPA to make some effort to limit their own authority through 
a comprehensive rulemaking process. What such an action would do 
toward protecting the environment is another question entirely.  While 
                                            
 79. Id. at 767. 
 80. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 53.  
 81. Id. at 36. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 54. 
 85. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
 86. Gardner recognizes the political difficulties presented by the Congressional 
amendment process.  GARDNER, supra note 1, at 56. 
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this solution would not prove painless, it presents a more likely 
resolution to the definitional question.  
B.  Dredge and Fill 
While operating within the “waters of the United States” will bring 
one within the geographical jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act, it will 
not necessarily make one subject to regulation under the Act.87  Among 
the activities prohibited by the Clean Water Act is the “point source 
discharge” of “dredged or fill material.”88  Thus, removing vegetation, 
excavating, dredging, and draining wetlands is not itself illegal.89  The 
illegality arises with the discharge of materials.90  Here, too, definitions 
have proven problematic.91  The Act defines “point source” as “any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,”92 and discharge has been 
defined as “an addition of a pollutant from a point source.”93  Thus, when 
a North Carolina developer wanted to drain 700 acres of wetland to 
construct a housing development he simply dug ditches around the 
property and hauled the dredged material offsite to avoid the section 404 
process.94  The Corps observed these activities but determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction because the developer was not discharging the 
material on the wetland itself.95  Once the wetland was drained, the 
developer had it reclassified and built his development.96  After this 
incident, the Corps established a final rule that interpreted the addition of 
dredge and fill material to include “incidental fallback” materials (those 
materials that fell to the ground during removal), but this rule was soon 
overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in National 
Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as an invalid 
interpretation of the Clean Water Act.97 
The Supreme Court had a chance to weigh in on the definitional 
question in Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of 
                                            
 87. Id. at 58. 
 88. Id. at 57. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). 
 93. Id. § 1362(12). 
 94. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 61. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 62 (citing 145 F.3d 1399, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  
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Engineers.98  In this case, the question was whether relocating topsoil 
through the process of “deep ripping” constituted an addition of dredge 
or fill material within the meaning of the Act.99  The decision was a 4-4 
split, as Justice Kennedy had to recuse himself because he was a friend 
of the landowner.100  Thus, Gardner says, whether “deep plowing results 
in an addition of pollutant remains an open question.”101 
The above are just some of the definitional questions explored by 
Gardner in his book.  There are, as one can imagine, numerous other 
examples worth exploring, and Gardner does each great service by 
providing a clear explanation of the factors that have driven the debates.  
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In his conclusion, Gardner makes several recommendations for 
improving the system: 
• Congress should pass the Clean Water Restoration Act to 
remove doubts about federal jurisdiction over wetlands by 
deleting the reference to “navigable waters” in the Clean Water 
Act. 
• The Corps should reorient its regulatory philosophy. 
• The Corps needs to emphasize avoidance of wetland impacts and 
deny more permits. 
• The EPA should maintain its veto authority of wetland impacts 
and not hesitate to unsheathe it.  
• The Corps should eliminate NWP 21. 
• The Corps should make permit decisions on a watershed basis, 
taking into account cumulative impacts. 
• The Corps and EPA should identify minimization best practices. 
• The Corps should implement the regulatory preference for 
compensation from mitigation banks; at the same time, the Corps 
should tighten up on early credit releases. 
• Compensatory mitigation sites must be monitored by the 
agencies. 
• The Corps and other agencies should focus on the long-term 
stewardship of compensatory mitigation sites. 
                                            
 98. 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).  
 99. Id. at 812. 
 100. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 65.  
 101. Id. at 65. 
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• The Corps should encourage and accept preservation of high 
quality wetlands as compensatory mitigation, including 
“preservation only” packages. 
• The federal government should create and maintain incentives 
for wetland restoration, including the possibility of ecosystem 
credit stacking. 
• Congress should discontinue perverse incentives that contribute 
to wetland destruction.  
• The Corps and EPA should increase enforcement efforts and use 
technology to do so. 
• The Corps should provide more transparency in the section 404 
program.102 
Gardner’s recommendations are sound.  He envisions a process that 
involves participants at every level while recognizing the importance that 
agency discretion plays in the outcome.103  While these recommendations 
would require considerable financial commitments by Congress, their 
implementation would almost certainly create a better process as a 
whole.  That being said, one must assume that in this imperfect world, no 
such perfect system will ever exist.  However, great strides could be 
made if only a few of these recommendations were implemented, and the 
fates of several of them are chained together.  For example, if Congress 
were to clarify federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act by 
removing the term “navigable waters,” the Corps and EPA would be 
more able to provide transparency to the section 404 program and 
reorient their regulatory philosophy.  
One serious hurdle to Gardner’s recommendations is the economic 
strain that stems from a society that is already struggling against a 
recession.  Expansion of federal jurisdiction over wetlands would subject 
more development projects to the section 404 permitting process.  This in 
turn slows down economic development in the interest of environmental 
protection.  Such would also be the case if the Corps were to cut back on 
the number of permits it issues.  The result is that these regulatory 
changes would likely garner little in the way of political support at 
present.  
The obvious alternative to stronger regulation is to optimize the use 
of the mitigation banking system, as Gardner suggests.  While the overall 
viability of mitigation banking is still in question, the process does at 
least result in the preservation and restoration of wetlands.  It also 
promotes economic activity rather than restraining it.  Gardner’s 
                                            
 102. Id. at 191-96. 
 103. Id. at 197. 
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suggestion of credit stacking presents an intriguing option for promoting 
both the economic and environmental interests that are at stake here. 
Credit stacking generally refers to establishing two or more 
different types of ecosystem credits on the same parcel of 
property. For example, one spatially overlapping area might 
produce wetland, endangered species, water quality, and/or 
carbon sequestration credits. Credit stacking would permit the 
owner of the credits to sell them in different markets and thus 
have a diversified revenue stream.  One environmental benefit of 
stacking is that it may provide a financial incentive for some 
property owners to conserve their land when they might 
otherwise be reluctant to do so. The danger is that the property 
owner might be essentially selling the same environmental 
benefit multiple times.104 
It is probably true that under a stacking program a lower aggregate 
number of acreage would be protected because a single acre could 
qualify for several programs.  However, it is also probably true that more 
property owners would be enticed to protect their property through a 
stacking program because of the greater reward for doing so.  Such a 
program would come at a minimal cost to the government and would 
expand the market for energy and environmental credits.  As such, 
Gardner’s stacking proposal presents an option that should be strongly 
considered by policy makers. 
In conclusion, Lawyers, Swamps, and Money is both comprehensive 
and complete.  Professor Gardner brings to bear his considerable 
experience in wetland law to create a book that is both concise and 
refreshing in its treatment of the issues at hand.  Throughout the book, 
Gardner’s humor adds a pleasant touch that keeps the reader turning the 
pages.  In the end, the reader is left with a strong impression that wetland 
policy is in need of change; just how to implement that change in the 
face of economic and environmental pressures is the intellectual 
challenge.  In short, this book is a must read for anyone interested in 
learning about or hoping to change wetland policy in the United States.  
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